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Abstract: Background: We conducted a systematic review on the role of private health insurance to
complement the social health insurance system towards achieving universal health coverage in China.
This review presents the impacts of private health insurance on expanding coverage, increasing
access to healthcare, and financial protection. Methods: A systematic review was conducted by
searching peer-reviewed articles published between January 2000 and March 2018 in Web of Science,
PubMed, and China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database. The search terms included coverage
prevalence, access and financial protection related to private health insurance in China. A total of 31
studies were selected. Results: Coverage prevalence of private health insurance gradually increased
but it was unequally distributed across regions and populations. The expansion of social health
insurance has enhanced the total aggregate premium of private health insurance but has had a mixed
impact on the take-up of private health insurance. Private insurance beneficiaries were found to limit
their utilisation of healthcare services and there was no evidence that it ensured financial protection.
Conclusion: The role of private health insurance (PHI) in extending universal health coverage in
China was limited and therefore should not be overstated.
Keywords: private health insurance; healthcare financing; universal health coverage; China; access
to healthcare; financial protection
1. Introduction
In the early 2000s, the Chinese government began to increase spending to expand the social health
insurance system (SHI) after two decades of retrenchment. The public spending as the share of total
healthcare expenditure in 2003 was 36.2% and increased to 56% by 2012 [1], which mostly came in
the form of subsidisation for SHI contributions [2,3]. The increase in subsidies enabled people to
gain coverage primarily from SHI schemes. Analysis of national data suggests that the overall health
insurance coverage increased from 29.7% to 95.7% between 2003 and 2011 [4]. The three main SHI
schemes in China–the Urban Employees’ Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI), the Urban Residents’
Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) for UEBMI-uncovered urban registrants, and the New Cooperative
Medical Scheme (NCMS) for rural registrants–covered around 87% of the population [5]. Furthermore,
government subsidies enabled coverage benefits to expand services in inpatient care, outpatient care,
treatment of acute illness, and treatment of chronic disease [6].
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Despite the development, many households are exposed to healthcare-related financial risks
as SHI policies have limited coverage for treatment and prescriptions, co-payments, deductibles,
and limited reimbursement [6] (Table 1). The annual incidence of catastrophic health expenditure
continued to increase from 2003 at 12 to 12.9% in 2011 [4]. Furthermore, almost one-third of total health
expenditure still came from out-of-pocket payments in 2013 [7].
Table 1. Summary of China’s social health insurance institutions 1.
SHI Schemes 2 UEBMI NCMS URBMI
Year of launch 1998 2003 2007
Administration department Human Resource and SocialSecurity Health
Human Resource and
Social Security
Target population Urban employees Rural registrants Urban registrants without UEBMI
Pooling level Prefecture County Prefecture
Number of pools 333 2852 333
Enrolment Compulsory Voluntary Voluntary
Number of members 265 million 805 million 272 million
Individual contribution 2–3% of salary ¥30–50 ¥30–50
Employer/government
contribution 6–8% of salary ¥200 ¥200
Inpatient reimbursement rate 81% < 50% 64%
Outpatient reimbursement rate Depends on MSA 0–40% 3 0–40% 3
Reimbursement cap Six-times local average wage Eight-times localpeasants’ income Six-times local disposable income
1 Based on 2011–2012 data. 2 SHI = social health insurance; UEBMI = Urban Employees’ Basic Medical Insurance;
NCMS = New Cooperative Medical Scheme; URBMI = Urban Residents’ Basic Medical Insurance; FMS = Free
Medical Scheme; MSA = UEBMI’s individual medical savings account. 3 An approximate estimate as the coverage
of NCMS and URBMI gradually expanded and varied spatially; the data about UEBMI, NCMS, and URBMI refer
to [3,6,8–11].
Private health insurance (PHI) was introduced in China during the economic reforms of the 1980s.
The Chinese government has increasingly considered the role of PHI as a financial source to its health
system and address the coverage gap within the current SHI system [4,6]. Theoretically, the expansion
of PHI could improve the current SHI by 1) being a substitute form of health coverage for individuals
that are unable to get coverage from an SHI scheme; and 2) being a complementary and supplementary
coverage for individuals covered by a plan in the SHI scheme. PHI prevalence was initially low and
limited to corporate customers, who bought PHI for their employees. Since the mid-1990s, demand
for PHI increased and more commercial insurers entered [12]. In 2003, there were only around three
hundred PHI products in the market and no specialised PHI companies [12], while in 2013, more
than one hundred commercial insurers and five specialised PHI companies operated PHI business,
providing thousands of products [13].
In recent years, the PHI market has rapidly grown in terms of total aggregate premium income,
whereas its compensation long accounted for a minor part of total health expenditure (Figure 1).
Government officials especially aim to support SHI and PHI to become mutually reinforcing, such that
PHI helps SHI to fill the gaps in coverage depth and height, and in turn the SHI expansion boosts the
PHI market by increasing the awareness of the importance of health insurance and leaving sufficient
room for PHI operation [13–15]. For example, the government has encouraged employers to purchase
PHI for their employers in addition to being under the UEBMI scheme of SHI and implemented
regulations to simplify the compensation process between PHI insurers and local SHI agencies [16].
Most recently, the government has offered tax incentives for employers and individuals purchasing
PHI through a series of pilot programmes in several major urban centres [17].
While the Chinese government has increasingly considered extending the role of PHI, there are
ongoing debates among global health scholars and policymakers over its effectiveness in expanding
coverage and supporting the principles of universal health coverage (UHC). There is uncertainty on
how effectively PHI can address the three dimensions of UHC with regards to the breadth (covered
population), depth (covered benefits) and height (covered costs) of coverage [18]. An argument
about the weakness of PHI’s ability to expand coverage is its principle that aims to meet demand—a
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combination of willingness and capacity to pay, which may put low-income populations at risk of not
being able to obtain PHI coverage due to their inability to pay [19]. Certain groups might also be given
risk-rated premiums, causing it to be unaffordable for this population to maintain and sustain their
coverage [20].
Figure 1. Income and indemnities of private health insurance (PHI), and the share of PHI indemnities
in total health expenditure in China. Data source: Yearbook of China’s Insurance 2014 (1 yuan or
¥1 ≈ US$0.14 at the current exchange rate. The following conversations referred to this rate).
Furthermore, the PHI market is vulnerable to market failures such as moral hazard and adverse
selection. Moral hazard may contribute to patients using sub-optimal high levels of care, and physicians
to prescribe unnecessarily expensive medications and more intensive treatments [21,22]. Insurers
respond to moral hazard through co-payments and/or deductibles, therefore putting beneficiaries at risk
for limited financial protection [23]. Adverse selection occurs as insurers have inaccurate information
about the health status of enrolees. Insurers may set premiums based on average risks across the
population (the community rating) [23]. The premium will be worth paying only for those with above
average health risks, and therefore insurers may set the higher premium than the community rating,
resulting in greater adverse selection. These factors may limit PHI’s ability to meeting principles of
universal coverage [21,24], and could even exacerbate inequities in the society [25].
Advocates of PHI contend that PHI can potentially meet the goal of a social health insurance
system to address current existing coverage gaps [26,27]. By introducing a different source of funding
into the health system, the government can then better allocate resources to the population, improve
weak administrative capability in the public sector [28], and solve limited public fiscal space for
SHI [29]. They also argue that PHI is affordable to those who already rely on out-of-pocket payments
for healthcare [24], and government subsidies can help those who cannot afford PHI [26]. The World
Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank have ambiguous views on extending coverage
through PHI. They believe that PHI can contribute to expanding coverage prevalence and laying
foundation for national insurance, but they also note its limitations [30].
In China, there have been some studies that associated PHI’s ability to address one or two issues
with coverage gaps [14,31,32]. However, there is inconclusive evidence that suggest PHI can effectively
extend overage and meet UHC principles. The purpose of our study was to conduct a systematic
review that synthesises empirical evidence about PHI’s ability to play a role in financing China’s
healthcare system and meet UHC principles. The review specifically focuses on understanding the
role of PHI to expand coverage (in presence of expanding SHI), improve access to care, and provide
financial protection. The current studies about PHI are still insufficient and fragmented. No study
specifically and empirically associated the impacts of PHI with the three principles of UHC, and to our
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knowledge, no peer-reviewed systematic review on this topic has yet been published. To fill this gap,
the review attempts to provide a broader understanding of how PHI have contributed to or limitedly
contributed to these coverage targets by synthesising existing empirical evidence about PHI in China.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Search Strategy
This review focused on understanding the impacts of PHI on the UHC principles: Coverage
prevalence, access to care, and financial protection [18]. The PRISMA guideline for systematic
reviews [33] was adopted to design the search for peer-reviewed research articles in both English
and Chinese that were published between January 2000 and March 2018. Three databases were
selected: Web of Science (all databases), PubMed, and the China Knowledge Resource Integrated
Database (CNKI), which is the largest, and most frequently updated database of Chinese-language
academic publications.
We used the following search terms for all three synonyms of private health insurance in English:
Private medical insurance, commercial health insurance, and commercial medical insurance. The terms
used to refer to PHI in China were shangye Jiankang baoxian, and shangye yiliao baoxian. For the two
English-language databases, the keyword “China” was included with each of the three search terms.
This was not necessary for searches conducted in the CNKI database as all identified studies from
CNKI are China-related.
Literature search was divided into three parts: 1) The coverage prevalence of PHI in China
(including the impact of SHI on PHI coverage prevalence), 2) the effect of PHI on access to healthcare
in China, and 3) the financial protection afforded by PHI in China. For coverage prevalence, the search
terms were “prevalence”, “demand”, and “coverage” in English, and “xuqiu” (demand) or “fugai”
(coverage) in Chinese. For access, the search terms were “access” or “utilisation/utilization” in English,
and “keji” (access), “fuwu shiyong/liyong)” (service utilisation), “fuwu xuqiu” (service demand),
“jiuyi” (using medical care), or “zhiliao” (treatment) were used in CNKI. For financial protection, the
search terms “expenditure”, “expense”, “spending”, “payment”, or “cost” were used in the English
language databases, while “zhichu” (expenditure), “huafei” (a less formal synonym of expenditure),
“feiyong” (cost), and “jingjifudan” (financial burden) were used in CNKI. In addition, the citations of
the included papers were scanned. If an article with a relevant title was cited but not identified in this
search, it was added to the final review list after checking its eligibility using the criteria below.
The search strings used in Web of Science are presented here as an example of the searches used
across the listed databases:
Search One: TS = ((health OR medical) AND (private OR commercial) AND (insurance china)
AND (prevalence OR demand OR coverage));
Search Two: TS = ((health OR medical) AND (private OR commercial) AND (insurance china)
AND (utilization OR utilisation OR access));
Search Three: TS = ((health OR medical) AND (private OR commercial) AND (insurance china)
AND (expenditure OR expense OR spending OR payment OR cost)).
2.2. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
The following are the inclusion criteria for the studies selected for this review: (1) Empirical
studies that were related to at least one of the three aspects of PHI, (2) that were conducted in
China/Chinese health system, (3) that provided clear and full information of research design and
methods, 4) that occurred between January 2000–March 2018, (5) and that were written in English and
Chinese. The following are the exclusion criteria for the studies selected for this review: (1) Studies
that examined willingness to buy PHI rather than enrolment or purchase, 2) that were based on tertiary
data (i.e., those derived from other studies’ outcomes of analysing primary or secondary data) were
not included, in order to avoid citing the same study repeatedly, (3) that did not examine one of the
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three aspects, i.e., coverage prevalence, access to care, and financial protection, (4) or that are editorials,
commentaries, conference abstracts, book chapters, and discursive essays. Full text of the remaining
papers was screened to exclude those that do not meet the inclusion criteria.
2.3. Quality Assessment and Risk of Bias
Two reviewers (R.W. and N.L.) independently assessed the quality of the studies included in
the review using a quality-graded protocol with a 10-point scale system (see Appendix A). This
appraisal tool was adapted from existing tools in previous relevant studies [34–37], and handbooks
of systematic review [38,39] to suit this study. Appraisal results from two reviewers were compared.
If the difference in the appraisal has no more than 1 point, then the average point was taken. The
two reviewers discussed studies that had more than 1-point difference to reach consensus. Studies
that were appraised as being low quality (0-3.5 points) were considered to have high risk of bias and
therefore excluded from the review. Only studies that were appraised as being medium (4–6 points)
and high (6.5–10 points) quality were reviewed in the study. The supplemental document (Table S1)
provides a more detailed account of the appraisal process. Risk of bias across studies was considered.
Since for many of the reviewed studies, PHI is not their only research objective, and thus the result
about PHI may not be crucial to publication, the publication bias on PHI should be moderate. To
minimise the bias, we not only reviewed the text of included articles but also directly scanned all
result tables and appendices to make sure all data about PHI, regardless of statistical significance,
were extracted. This could avoid the omission of data about PHI that either do not have statistical
significance or do not interest the authors.
3. Results
3.1. Characteristics of Included Studies
The initial search identified 692 studies (Figure 2). Forty-four studies met the inclusion criteria.
Of the 44 included studies, the average score of the quality assessment was 5.10 out of 10 points. From
the quality assessment, 16 were categorised as high-quality studies, 15 as medium-quality studies,
and 13 as low-quality studies. All the low-quality studies were removed and a total of thirty-one
studies were included in the review. Among the 31 studies, 24 studies examined the prevalence
and distribution of PHI coverage (including 14 examined the relationship between PHI and SHI),
10 examined the effects of PHI on access to care, and nine examined the financial impacts of PHI (some
studies are counted more than once due to engaging in more than one aspects of this review). For
details of all these reviewed studies and the quality assessment results, see Table A1 (Appendix B).
Furthermore, 20 studies presented individual-level evidence, which focused on individuals’
behaviour of obtaining PHI, and individual use of healthcare or spending on healthcare. Nine studies
used the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), an ongoing longitudinal household national
survey that commenced in 1989. Five studies used the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal
Study (CHARLS), a longitudinal national study that started in 2008 and became nationwide in 2011
and included people aged 45 and above. Two studies used the State Council’s URBMI Household
Survey, ranging from 2007 to 2010; one used the Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey
(CLHLS) that began in 1998 and studied people aged 65 years and above. The other studies used data
from ad hoc, one-off surveys, most of which were primary data. Additionally, 11 studies focused on
aggregate level evidence. The most common data source used were provincial-level statistics provided
by government departments. Another source of aggregate data was from the National Health Service
Survey (NHSS), which provides the county-level data.
Nine individual-level studies examined longitudinal data, and the other 11 individual-level
studies examined cross-sectional data. In terms of aggregate-level studies, all but one examined
longitudinal data. All survey databases used in these studies, including CHNS, CHARLS, NHSS,
the URBMI survey, CLHLS and government provincial-level statistics, included multiple Chinese
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provinces. For one-off surveys, the scope of data collection varied depending on the objectives of
the studies.
Figure 2. The flowchart of the systematic searches and selection.
Twenty-nine out of the 31 studies employed regression models as their principal methods of
data analysis, adjusting for individual and aggregate background factors. Generally, these regression
models included basic linear, logit, or probit models for cross-sectional data, and fixed effects, random
effects, or dynamic models for longitudinal data. Some studies introduced instrumental variables to
treat endogeneity. Other studies included difference-in-difference estimators to extract policy effects
by comparing treatment and control groups. A few studies used the Heckman models or Two-part
models to handle sample selection.
3.2. Coverage Prevalence
3.2.1. Trend and Distribution
As there is no official data about the population coverage rates of PHI from the China Insurance
Regulatory Commission or other state regulatory or statistical agencies, all such estimates were derived
from surveys. Studies examining nationwide representative samples (those include multiple provinces
and both urban and rural areas) reported the lowest coverage rate of 4% between 2004 and 2006 and the
highest coverage rate at 12% recorded in 2013 [32,40–42]. This suggests that PHI coverage prevalence
gradually increased over time. Those that focused on the latest urban samples reported the highest
coverage rates: 19% [43] and 35% [44], respectively, from two studies using relatively small urban
samples. Instead of population coverage, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission publishes
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Insurers’ aggregate premium income of selling PHI policies (equal to customers’ spending on buying
PHI aside of taxes) at the provincial level every year, and all related studies in this review used the
statistics. The total PHI premium income substantially increased by 1629% around the same time
period, from ¥6.5 (≈ US$0.9) billion in 2000 to ¥112.4 (≈ US$15.7) billion in 2013 [45].
In terms of the distribution (Table 2), one study examined the 2006 CHNS data and found that
rural residents in eastern provinces were more likely to have PHI than their inland counterparts, other
things being equal [46]. Another study found that eastern provinces were associated with greater
income from PHI premiums per capita than central or western inland provinces, other things being
equal [47]. Two nationwide studies found that urban residents were more likely to be covered by
PHI than rural residents, other things being equal [41,48]. Another multi-province study found that
students living in urban areas were more likely to have PHI than non-students, but this phenomenon
was found to disappear in rural areas [32]. One study that focused on three eastern affluent cities of
Beijing, Shanghai, and Xiamen, found no significant difference in PHI coverage between urban and
rural residents [44]. Additionally, one study showed that individuals who migrated from rural areas to
urban areas were either more likely to be insured by PHI or completely uninsured than urban locals,
other things being equal [41].
Table 2. Comparison of PHI coverage spatially or between different migration status 1.
Ref. ID Study period Comparison Results
[47] 2007–2013
East vs. inland
East provinces were associated with higher PHI premium income
[46] 2006 For rural residents, living in the east was associated with a higherchance of enrolment into PHI
[48] 2011
Urban vs. rural
Living in urban areas was associated with a higher chance of enrolment
into PHI
[41] 2011, 2013 Living in urban areas was associated with a higher chance of enrolmentinto PHI
[44] 2011 Living in urban areas was NOT significantly associated with a higherchance of enrolment into PHI
[32] 2000, 2004, 2006 For students, living in urban areas was associated with a higher chanceof enrolment into PHI
[41] 2011, 2013 Migrants vs. locals Rural-to-urban migrants was associated with a higher chance ofenrolment into PHI
1 If unspecified, all comparisons passed the significance test.
3.2.2. Relationship between PHI and SHI Coverage
There is mixed evidence with regards to the impact of SHI enrolment on obtaining PHI. Two
studies supported a positive correlation between PHI enrolment and SHI enrolment [32,46]. However,
two studies found a negative correlation [41,42], and one study reported a neutral (insignificant)
relationship [40] (Table 3). Additionally, one study found that the NCMS (rural SHI scheme) membership
increased adults’ PHI enrolment, but decreased enrolment among children, particularly among lower
income groups [14]. Another study found that enrolment in the SHI schemes (UEBMI, URBMI,
and NCMS) was negatively associated with enrolment in PHI in the whole population. However,
disaggregating the data suggests that the negative correlation was only significant in urban areas [41].
Another study found that enrolment in the NCMS had a negative correlation with PHI enrolment
between 2004 and 2006, but the correlation became positive between 2006 and 2009 [49].
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Table 3. Relationship between PHI prevalence and social health insurance(SHI) system expansion 1.
Ref. ID Study Period PHI Indicator SHI Indicator SHI Schemes 2 Sample Correlation
Aggregate Level Evidence
[47] 2007–2013 Income Percentage of enrolees All Mixed Positive
[50] 2002–2007 Income Percentage of enrolees All Mixed Positive
[51] 2000–2007 Income Fund income UEBMI & URBMI Mixed Positive
[52] 2002–2009 Income Fund income UEBMI Mixed Positive
[53] 2003–2012 Income Average compensation UEBMI & URBMI Mixed Positive
[54] 2005–2010 Income Fund income All Mixed Positive
[55] 2005–2011 Compound index 3 Compound index 4 NCMS Mixed Positive
Individual Level Evidence
[32] 2000,2004,2006 Enrolment Enrolment Urban schemes Urban Positive
[46] 2006 Enrolment Enrolment NCMS Rural Positive
[42] 1989–2009 Enrolment Enrolment All Mixed Negative
[41] Enrolment Enrolment All
Mixed Negative
2011, 2013 Urban Negative
Rural Neutral
[40] 2004–2011 Enrolment Enrolment URBMI Urban Neutral
[14] 2011 Enrolment Enrolment NCMS
Adult Positive
Child Negative
[49] 2004, 2006, 2009 Enrolment Enrolment NCMS Rural
Negative
Positive
1 If unspecified, all presented positive or negative correlations passed the significance test, otherwise neutral
correlation was reported. 2 UEBMI = Urban Employees’ Basic Medical Insurance; URBMI = Urban Residents’ Basic
Medical Insurance; NCMS = New Cooperative Medical Scheme. 3 Index generated by income, expenditure, claim
ratio, etc. 4 Index generated by income, expenditure, ratio of income and expenditure, etc.
On the contrary, all studies that examined the provincial-level correlation of insurers’ income
from PHI premium with SHI scheme coverage indicators concluded that SHI expansion increased
insurers’ income from PHI premium, other things being equal [47,50–55]. These studies examined a
range of different regions, time periods, and SHI schemes. Five made regression models that controlled
for demographic factors (e.g., average age, gender ratios, affluence, and education levels) [47,50–53],
and two used other methods [54,55].
3.3. Access to Healthcare Services
The findings of this review on access to healthcare were mainly informed by utilisation of
healthcare services. For generic utilisation (including utilisation of both outpatient and inpatient care),
the evidence is mixed. One study found that having PHI had no impact on utilisation compared
with people without PHI coverage [56]. Another study found that having PHI increased utilisation
compared with those without PHI for urban population but not for rural population, other things
being equal [57]. The third study found that having PHI increased utilisation compared with those
covered under the NCMS, other things being equal [58] (Table 4).
There is some evidence to suggest that having PHI enabled beneficiaries to utilise inpatient services,
other things being equal (Table 4). Specifically, one study found that enrolment in PHI was positively
associated with the utilisation of inpatient care [59]. Another study found that enrolment in PHI was
associated with increasing lengths of hospitalisation between 2000 and 2004, but the association was
not significant between 2006 and 2009 [60]. However, a study that focused on rural-to-urban migrants
found no significant association of PHI enrolment with the migrants’ inpatient utilisation [61]. At the
aggregate level the findings show no significant relationship between PHI coverage prevalence and
the average utilisation of inpatient services [62,63], suggesting that PHI minimally benefit inpatient
utilisation for the population as a whole.
By contrast, there is minimal evidence that suggests PHI enrolment increased the utilisation of
outpatient services, other things being equal (Table 4). Only one study reported a positive relationship
between enrolment in PHI and outpatient utilisation [64]. However, in this study, the PHI was restricted
to substitutive health insurance (enrolled in PHI only). There was no significant correlation on the
effect of having complementary PHI (the marginal effect of PHI enrolment for those enrolled in both
PHI and SHI) on utilising outpatient services. In addition, the single aggregate-level study reported
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that the percentage of PHI enrolees had a positive relationship with the average number of outpatient
visits of rural counties [63].
Although few PHI policies in China cover preventative care (i.e., physical examinations and
vaccinations) [65], three studies found that PHI enrolment had a significant positive relationship with
the utilisation of preventative services [60,61,66].
Table 4. The correlation between PHI and access to healthcare 1.
Ref. ID Study Period PHI Indicator Type of Healthcare Utilised Sample Correlation
[56] 2004 Enrolment Generic healthcare Mixed Neutral
[58] 2008 Enrolment Generic healthcare Mixed Positive 2
[57] 2008 Enrolment Generic healthcare Mixed/urban/rural Positive/Neutral 3
[60] 2000, 2004 Enrolment
Inpatient care
Mixed
Positive 4
Preventative care Positive
[59] 2007, 2008 Enrolment
Inpatient care
Urban
Positive
Outpatient care Neutral
[61] Enrolment
Inpatient care Rural-to-urban
migrants
Neutral
2007–2010 Outpatient care Neutral
Preventative care Positive
[66] 2004, 2006, 2009 Enrolment
Outpatient care
Rural
Negative
Preventative care Positive
[64] 2011, 2013 Enrolment Outpatient care Mixed Positive/Neutral 5
[62] 2006–2010 Provincial PHI premiumincome over GDP
Inpatient care (the average length of
hospitalisation) Mixed Neutral
[63] 2003
Percentage of PHI
enrolees in a county
Inpatient care (the number of admissions
per 1000 in 52 weeks) Rural
Neutral
Outpatient care (the number of visits per
1000 in 2 weeks) Positive
1 If unspecified, all comparisons are between enrolees and non-enrolees of PHI, and all presented positive or
negative correlations passed the significance test, otherwise neutral correlation was reported. 2 Referring to the
NCMS (New Cooperative Medical Scheme). 3 For the whole and the urban population, not for the rural population.
4 The positive relationship exists between 2000 and 2004 but disappears between 2006 and 2009. 5 Positive for PHI
as primary health insurance only; no correlation for complementary PHI.
3.4. Financial Protection
The findings of this review suggest that having PHI did not reduce out of pocket payments.
Two studies found that enrolment in a PHI plan was not associated with reduced out-of-pocket
payments (Table 5) [56,67]. One study found that PHI increased the out-of-pocket share of total health
expenditure among high-income populations but had no such effect among low-income populations
between 2000 and 2004 [60]. The other study found that enrolment into PHI was associated with higher
chances of out-of-pocket payments of more than ¥1000 (≈ US$140), and more than ¥5000 (≈ US$700),
compared to out-of-pocket payments of less than ¥1000 [44]. Only one study found that PHI reduced
out-of-pocket payments for those covered solely by PHI but did not reduce out-of-pocket payment for
those covered by both PHI and SHI [67].
While out-of-pocket healthcare expenditure indicates financial risk, total healthcare expenditure,
measured by gross healthcare payments before insurance reimbursement, reflects the financial burden
of the health system more than it indicates individuals’ financial risk [44,68]. Four studies found
that enrolment in PHI increased total healthcare expenditure of the enrolees (Table 5) [42,44,57,69].
No individual-level opposite evidence exists. Only two studies looked at the financial impacts of PHI
at the aggregate data. One found that the percentage of PHI coverage had no significant impact on the
per-capita annual medical expenditure at the county level [63]. The other found that per-capita PHI
premium spending significantly associated with less per-capita medical expenditure at the provincial
level [70].
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Table 5. The correlation between PHI and financial risk 1.
Ref. ID Study Period PHI Indicator Financial Risk Indicator Sample Correlation
[56] 2004 Enrolment Out-of-pocket payments Mixed Neutral
[67] 2011–2012 Enrolment Out-of-pocket payments Mixed Neutral/Negative 2
[60] 2000, 2004 Enrolment Out-of-pocket payments (as a share of totalhealth expenditure) Mixed Positive/Neutral
3
[44] 2011 Enrolment
Out-of-pocket payments exceeding ¥1000
and ¥5000 Urban
Positive for both
Total health expenditure exceeding ¥1000 Positive
[69] 2003, 2005 Enrolment Total health expenditure Urban Positive 4
[57] 2008 Enrolment Total health expenditure Mixed/urban/rural Positive/Neutral 5
[42] 1989–2009 Enrolment Total health expenditure Mixed Positive
[63] 2003 Percentage of PHIenrolees in a county Per-capita health expenditure Rural Neutral
[70] 2006–2012 Provincial per-capitaPHI premium income Per-capita health expenditure Mixed Negative
1 If unspecified, all comparisons are between enrolees and non-enrolees of PHI, and all presented positive or negative
correlations passed the significance test, otherwise neutral correlation was reported. 2 Neutral for all PHI and
complementary PHI, and negative for PHI as primary health insurance only. 3 Only positive for the high-income
group between 2000 and 2004, but neutral for the low-income group and all groups between 2006 and 2009. 4
Comparing to SHI. 5 Positive for the whole and the rural population, but neutral for the urban population.
4. Discussion
In the past 20 years, the publicly managed SHI helped China move towards expanding health
insurance coverage to its population. However, the extent to which the depth (services) and height
(costs) of coverage was still limited due to restricted government’s financial capacity [4,6], which is
also an international problem for many countries on the way to approach UHC [28,29]. For policy
makers, the main goal of introducing PHI was to further assist with the expansion of SHI and extend
the depth and height of coverage [13,27].
This systematic review found that the coverage prevalence of PHI gradually increased since 2000,
while commercial insurers’ income from PHI increased to a greater extent [45]. This suggests a rapid
increase in the cost of PHI and an upmarket movement of China’s PHI market. Additionally, in China’s
PHI market, many PHI plans are sold as part of a bundle package including other savings products or
life and accident insurance products [71], so it is possible that insurers’ income from the whole product
bundle is counted as income from PHI premium, pushing up its costs. As a result, the increase of
insurers’ income from PHI premium did not go along with a substantially larger number of people
covered by PHI.
It is still unclear whether the expanding SHI coverage boosted or suppressed the coverage
prevalence of PHI. The direct evidence about the impact of SHI enrolment on the uptake of PHI
is mixed. On the contrary, there is strong evidence that the SHI expansion was associated with
insurer’s income increase from PHI premium, controlling for economic growth and relevant population
characteristics, but the evidence is indirect since insurer’s income increase from PHI premium does not
equal the increase in population coverage of PHI as stated above.
One theory suggests that public health insurance programmes can crowd out PHI due to the
duplication of benefits [72,73]. By contrast, several scholars have argued that public health insurance
expansion may help boost the coverage prevalence of PHI. According to [15], the limited coverage of
SHI in China can cause PHI insurers to lower their cost and introduce additional plans to attract the
uninsured to purchase coverage. Meanwhile, the introduction of SHI helps disseminate knowledge
about health insurance in countries where awareness of insurance is rare, increasing the demand for
PHI [13,14]. As a result, SHI could theoretically cause the premium income of PHI to increase. It is,
however, unclear the extent of this effect on the coverage prevalence of PHI in the Chinese context,
and this needs further investigation. The review found two studies suggesting a positive correlation
between having PHI and the utilisation of inpatient care while one study on rural-to-urban migrants
found the correlation being neutral (Table 4). However, little evidence suggests having PHI affect the
use of outpatient care. This is supported by findings from studies in other countries [74–76]. In China,
the benefits package of PHI given to beneficiaries usually includes protection for critical diseases,
compensation for hospitalisation, and access to superior amenities, such as VIP (premium wards, better
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services, etc.) [65,71]. However, due to price control and actuarial difficulties, most PHI plans limitedly
provide coverage for outpatient services and medications [77,78]. This study also found a positive
correlation between PHI enrolment and the utilisation of preventative services, even if few PHI plans
tend to include them [65]. A possible explanation for this is that commercial insurers offer additional
benefits for individuals that take advantage of using preventative services.
There is no evidence that suggests PHI can reduce out of pocket expenses for beneficiaries. PHI
plans include various levels of deductibles and benefit packages. For example, many PHI policies
compensate costs of hospitalisation but restrict covering medication costs. However, several studies
have found that the majority of out of pocket expenses is attributable to medication costs [77,79,80].
Therefore, financial protection of PHI was compromised. There have been findings from Brazil and
South Korea that also suggest that enrolment into PHI did not reduce out of pocket expenses on
healthcare [81,82].
There is evidence that PHI increased individual total health expenditure. This could cause more
financial burden to governments, as a part of the expenditure must be reimbursed by insurers and
insurers often receive governments subsidies for PHI. For the reasons of raising total health expenditure,
in addition to utilisation increased by PHI, commercial insurers may have less bargaining power over
the price of care than public insurers, particularly in a single-payer system such as the SHI system in
China [20], further pushing up total health expenditure. There has been supporting evidence from
foreign countries [22,83].
In order to improve PHI’s depth of coverage and providing financial protection, the government
may want to define the mandated benefits package. For example, the governments of the Netherlands,
South Africa, and to an extent, the United States, have required PHI policies to provide basic services
to all their beneficiaries [84–86]. However, on one hand, effectively determining what type of covered
benefits included in PHI policies needs careful consideration, and to an extent exceed the capacity
of regulations. On the other hand, such policy lends itself to subsidisation. Whether it is worth
subsidising PHI rather than expanding investment in SHI is open to question [87].
There was moderate evidence that suggests the distribution of PHI in China was unequal and
favoured the relatively affluent urban and eastern areas. Taking into account the well-documented
pro-rich demand for PHI at the individual level together [21–23], our findings thus suggest that PHI
is not an effective form of coverage for low-income populations, especially for those living in less
affluent areas, where there might be fewer PHI selling agencies, lower availability of PHI information,
and poorer connection between insurers and healthcare providers, since PHI sellers tend to cluster in
densely populated affluent urban areas for a prudent strategy [75].
Consequently, a big challenge to implementing PHI as a means for improving UHC is expanding
its coverage prevalence and meanwhile protecting equity. As profitability of the PHI market in
China is still questionable [13], commercial insurers hesitate to expand business to attract less affluent
population groups [65]. Government subsidisation or tax break may help its expansion. However, the
benefits mainly flow to the more affluent groups, as they are more likely to have the financial means to
purchase PHI. In addition, affluent regions in China may introduce additional subsidies to its residents
compared to less affluent regions, thus increasing inequalities with regards to accessing PHI across the
country. Scholars have suggested strong government regulations against voluntary enrolment and
risk-pricing of PHI to promote equal access to PHI [23]. For example, in countries like Uruguay and
Switzerland, the governments mandate the purchase of PHI [87], and in the Netherlands and Chile,
pricing of some PHI policies is income-related rather than risk-related [84,87].
This study has two suggestions for future research based on the findings. First, given the
inconsistency between aggregate PHI premium income and coverage prevalence, to examine the
coverage contribution of PHI, only analysing premium income data is at the risk of being misleading.
Nevertheless, most policy articles concerning the present development and prospect of PHI in China
only used premium income data [12,13,88,89] possibly because it is relatively available and easy to use
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(there is insofar no official PHI take-up or population coverage data in China, except those derived
from the surveys as previously mentioned).
Second, PHI plans, as voluntary for-profit health insurance schemes, are intrinsically different from
SHI schemes, as SHI’s objectives are set at the system level and prioritize people’s health needs [25].
The nature of PHI, including enrolment that is based on capacity to pay, risk pricing, and limited
population coverage, raises the concern that it could undermine the essential equity objective of UHC
when it benefits the enrolees at the expense of others through relocating limited health resources
according to membership rather than need [20,25]. However, this review found that the aggregate-level
evidence that addresses health equity questions is limited and tends to be inconsistent with those from
the individual level. More studies at the aggregate level is needed.
This review has several limitations. There were only a limited number of studies identified in this
topic and the data used is fragmented. Therefore, it was not possible to extract the data and aggregate
them to conduct a meta-analysis or any quantitative analysis. Instead, this study aimed to collate the
studies on this topic and present them in a narrative way, in order to better understand how PHI has
been working from the perspectives of addressing the UHC objectives in China. Second, most of the
reviewed studies relied on regression models on survey data. There was a lack of experimental studies.
Although many of these studies suggested causality in discussion, the results, which are basically
associational, need to be interpreted with caution. Third, all the studies used quantitative data with
different methodologies and data sources. This review differentiated them mainly according to validity
and reliability of methods and data used, and subsequently only reviewed medium- and high-quality
studies. It is impossible to rule out useful information in the low-quality group. Lastly, this review
included limited studies that present the current situation in China. However, it is able to reflect on
PHI’s contribution to the healthcare system in place, because the basic modality of China’s healthcare
financing, as mentioned in the introduction, has not changed since the late 1990s [3,13], and hence,
data in the 2000s-2010s remain relevant to the current situation.
5. Conclusions
To our knowledge, this is the first systematic literature review that focused on understanding
the Chinese government’s decision to expand the role of PHI to pursue UHC objectives. This review
found that PHI coverage prevalence has increased moderately in China. However, the growth of
PHI premium income was higher compared to take-up of the coverage type. The distribution of
PHI enrolees favoured people residing in relatively affluent eastern and urban areas. Whether the
expanding SHI coverage boosted or suppressed the coverage prevalence of PHI is still unclear. The
contribution of PHI to depth of coverage was limited. Evidence suggests that it had little impact on
the use of outpatient care and a mixed impact on the use of inpatient care. Coverage of PHI did not
demonstrate financial protection, because it increased total health expenditure but did not reduce
out-of-pocket health expenditure. In sum, it suggests that PHI’s contribution to extending UHC in
China has been limited and therefore should not be overstated. Government subsidisation, mandated
benefits packages, and strong regulations on the PHI market may help PHI to play a more effective
role in the progress towards UHC.
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Appendix A
The Quality Assessment Protocol
After screening against the inclusion and exclusion criteria, the quality of the included papers
was assessed with a quality-grading system, following the guidelines of a systematic review [38,39],
and adapted from the protocols in the previous relevant studies [34–37]. In principle, it complies with
the commonly adopted hierarchy of evidence in health research, i.e., systematic reviews/meta-analyses
coming with the highest credibility, followed by randomised controlled trials (RCTs), cohort studies,
case-control studies, cross-sectional studies, and case studies [90].
This quality-grading system gives a maximum of 10 points to an included study. While there is
no review study, RCTs or case-control studies included, the grading system basically gives more points
to included studies using data with longer time spans, and those methodologically controlling sample
differences better and ensuring robustness of results more effectively. For the external validity, the
grading system gives more points to those examining wider populations. Finally, given that many
included studies focused on SHI but examined PHI in passing, the grading system gives more points
to evidence from those that focused on PHI. The quality-grading system is listed at the end.
Using the quality-grading checklist, two reviewers (Wu R and Li N) independently assessed the
quality of the 44 included studies, and the appraisal results from the two reviewers were compared.
If the difference in the appraisal has no more than 1 point, then the average point was taken. The two
reviewers discussed studies that had more than 1-point difference to reach consensus. Studies which
received lower than 4 points, 4–6 points, and higher than 6 points were categorised as low, medium, or
high quality, respectively.
Quality-grading checklist (total: 10 points)
1. Does this study focus on PHI? (1 point)
2. Does the study provide clear information of the used data, including source, sample size, time
period, levels etc.? (1 point)
3. Are data analysed in the study nationwide sampling (including at least 15 provinces)? (2 points)
(a) Including data from at least 15 provinces (2 points);
(b) Including data from more than one province but less than 15 provinces (1 point);
(c) Data from only one province (0 point).
4. Are data analysed in the study longitudinal? (1 point)
5. How does this study deal with selection of enrolment into insurance? (3 points)
(a) Quasi-randomised controlled trials that create a matched control group through either a
propensity score matching method or a regression discontinuity design (3 points);
(b) Difference-in-difference studies where the pre- and postintervention periods for study and
control groups are the same and the characteristics of the two groups are controlled for
through regression (3 points);
(c) Regression studies that consider selection through the instrumental variable method (2
points);
(d) Regression studies that control for related background variables but do not consider
enrolment selection (1 point)
(e) Others (0 point)
6. Does the study examine data by applying a stratification approach? (1 point)
7. Does the study describe significance test, model robustness test, or other internal validity tests for
its statistical analysis? (1 point)
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No. Studies Data Source Study 
Period 
Geographic 
Area 
Principal Method Reviewer * 
Quality-grading Items † Average 
Grade 
Quality 
Category ‡ 
Action 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 [14] CHNS 
2000, 
2004, 2006 
9 provinces 
Logistic models with difference in difference 
estimator, without propensity score matching 
R1 1 1 1 1 3 0 1 
8.5 High Review 
R2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 
2 [91] Multi-centre retrospective 
study with 681 patients 
2010–2013 Shanghai Chi-square tests that compare PHI enrolment 
among different SHI status 
R1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1.5 Low Exclude 
R2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 [92] 
Phone survey using randomly 
generated landline numbers 
including 1500 respondents 
2010 Shenzhen Multivariate logistic models 
R1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
2 Low Exclude 
R2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
4 [44] 
Phone survey using random 
digit dialling method sampling 
landline numbers including 
5097 households 
2011 
Beijing, 
Shanghai, and 
Xiamen 
Logistic models 
R1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
6.5 High Review 
R2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5 [48] CHARLS 2011 28 provinces Bivariate probit models for both PHI enrolment 
and pension scheme enrolment 
R1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 
5 Medium Review 
R2 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 
6 [41] CHARLS 2011, 2013 28 provinces 
Multinomial logistic models for five  
insurance status 
R1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 
7.5 High Review 
R2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
7 [40] CHNS 2004–2011 9 provinces 
Logistic models with difference in difference 
estimator, without propensity score matching 
R1 1 1 1 1 3 0 0 
7 High Review 
R2 1 1 1 1 3 0 0 
8 [66] CHNS 
2004, 
2006, 2009 
9 provinces 
Probit models for health services use and linear 
probability models for calculating Concentration 
Indices 
R1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
5 Medium Review 
R2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
9 [56] CHNS 2004 9 provinces 
Heckman selection models that select healthcare 
users and then model their OOP payments 
R1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
4.5 Medium Review 
R2 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
10 [61] 
State Council URBMI 
Household Survey 
2007–2010 9 cities 
Instrumental variable regression, using the 
community-year level participation rate of each 
insurance programme among the non-migrant 
population as the instrumental variable 
R1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 
7.5 High Review 
R2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
11 [63] NHSS 2003 31 provinces 
Multivariate linear models for the number of 
outpatient visits, the number of inpatient visits 
and per capita annual medical expenditure 
R1 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 
6.5 High Review 
R2 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 
12 [93] 
Questionnaire survey of all first 
and fourth graders in four 
elementary schools 
2005 
Pinggu district in 
Beijing 
Chi-square tests that compare health access 
indicators among different insurance status 
R1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 Low Exclude 
R2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
13 [64] CHARLS 2011, 2013 28 provinces 
Heckman selection models that selects awareness 
of healthcare provider ownership and model 
utilisation for only outpatient users 
R1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 
6 Medium Review 
R2 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 
14 [69] 
Urban data–a hospital of PKU; 
rural data–a survey in 101 
villages 
Urban-
2003; 
rural-2005 
Urban–patient in 
Beijing; rural—5 
provinces 
Linear regression directly on health  
expenditure data 
R1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
5 Medium Review 
R2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
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15 [94] NHSS 2008, 2013 
Rural Shaanxi 
province 
Decomposition based on the logistic model for 
the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure 
representing OOP payments over 40% of the 
household capacity to pay 
R1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
3 Low Exclude 
R2 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
16 [95] NHSS 2002, 2007 Gansu province 
Kakwani index of progressivity of healthcare 
payments on gross income 
R1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
3.5 Low Exclude 
R2 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
17 [96] NHSS 2002, 2007 Heilongjiang 
province 
Kakwani index of progressivity of healthcare 
payments on gross income 
R1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
3 Low Exclude 
R2 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
18 [50] State statistics 2002–2007 3 provinces Linear models 
R1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
6 Medium Review 
R2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
19 [55] State statistics 2005–2011 Nationwide 
Degree of coupling referring to coupling theory 
in Physics 
R1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 
5 Medium Review 
R2 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 
20 [52] State statistics 2002–2009 30 Provinces Dynamic panel models with a first order lag 
R1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 
7 High Review 
R2 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 
21 [51] State statistics 2000–2007 Nationwide Linear models 
R1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 
7 High Review 
R2 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 
22 [54] State statistics 2005–2010 Nationwide 
Degree of Coordination based on the composite 
system synergy degree model 
R1 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 
6 Medium Review 
R2 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 
23 [42] CHNS 1989–2009 9 provinces 
Logistic models for PHI enrolment, and fixed 
effect models and instrumental variable 
regression for total health expenditure 
R1 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 
7 High Review 
R2 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 
24 [49] CHNS 
2004 2006 
2009 9 provinces 
Probit models with difference in difference 
estimator, without propensity score matching 
R1 1 1 1 1 3 0 0 
7 High Review 
R2 1 1 1 1 3 0 0 
25 [97] 
Household survey using 
stratified sampling including 
1600 households 
2006 
Shanghai 
municipality Linear models for logged expenditure on PHI 
R1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
3 Low Exclude 
R2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
26 [32] CHNS 2000, 
2004, 2006 
9 provinces Bivariate probit models with partial observability 
R1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
5.5 Medium Review 
R2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
27 [46] CHNS 2006 9 provinces 
Bivariate probit models for both PHI enrolment 
and NCMS enrolment 
R1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
5.5 Medium Review 
R2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
28 [53] State statistics 2003–2012 Nationwide Fixed effects models with per capita outpatient 
expenditure as the instrumental variable  
R1 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 
7.5 High Review 
R2 1 1 2 1 2 0 1 
29 [47] State statistics 2007–2013 31 provinces Fixed effects models 
R1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
8 High Review 
R2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
30 [31] State statistics 2004–2013 31 provinces Linear models 
R1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 
7 High Review 
R2 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 
31 [43] 
Questionnaire survey including 
557 individuals 
2012–2013 5 cities Logistic models 
R1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
5 Medium Review 
R2 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
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32 [98] 
Questionnaire survey of two 
districts. This study only 
included 900 working 
individuals of 1600 samples 
2010 Tianjin 
municipality 
Heckman-probit models that select willingness to 
buy PHI and then model the level of expenditure on 
PHI 
R1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
3.5 Low Exclude 
R2 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
33 [58] CHARLS 2008 2 provinces 
Logistic and multi-nominal models for types of 
healthcare 
R1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
4.5 Medium Review 
R2 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
34 [99] 
Questionnaire survey of a city 
including 1200 individuals 2011 Dongguan city 
Chi-square tests that compare utilisation among 
different health insurance status  
R1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 Low Exclude 
R2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
35 [57] CHARLS 2008 2 provinces 
Two-part models that select utilisation at first and 
then model logged health expenditure 
R1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
4 Medium Review 
R2 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
36 [62] State statistics 2006–2010 Nationwide Fixed effects models for the average length of 
hospitalisation 
R1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 
6 Medium Review 
R2 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 
37 [100] 
Household survey using 
multilevel stratified sampling 
including 5928 households 
2014 Three cities in 
Sichuan province 
Logistics models 
R1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
2 Low Exclude 
R2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
38 [60] CHNS 
2000, 
2004, 
2006, 2009 
9 provinces 
Logistic and linear models with difference in 
difference estimator, without propensity score 
matching 
R1 1 1 1 1 3 0 0 
7 High Review 
R2 1 1 1 1 3 0 0 
39 [59] 
State Council URBMI 
Household Survey 
2007, 2008 9 cities Probit models 
R1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7 High Review 
R2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
40 [67] Chinese longitudinal Healthy 
Longevity Survey (CLHLS)  
2011–2012 23 provinces Linear models 
R1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 
5 Medium Review 
R2 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 
41 [101] 
Questionnaire survey including 
4800 individuals 
2014 8 provinces 
Chi-square tests that compare the incidence of 
catastrophic health expenditure indicated by OOP 
payments over 40% of the household capacity to 
pay between PHI enrolment status 
R1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2 Low Exclude 
R2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
42 [102] NHSS 2003, 2008 
Rural Xinjiang 
province 
Kakwani index 
R1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
3 Low Exclude 
R2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
43 [103] Third Corps Survey 2010 Xingjiang Corps Aronson-Johnson-Lambert Redistributive effect 
R1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 Low Exclude 
R2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
44 [70] State statistics 2006–2012 31 provinces Fixed effects models 
R1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 
7 High Review 
R2 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 
 
  
* R1 = R. Wu; R2 = N. Li. † The item number corresponds to that in the quality-grading checklist in Appendix A. Except No. 2, that has a maximum of two points, and No. 5, that has a
maximum of three points, all others have a maximum of one point. ‡ low quality (0–3.5 points), medium quality (4–6 points), and high quality (6.5–10 points)
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